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Methodological Individualism and the 
Organizational Capabilities Approach 
 
 
 
Abstract 
During the last decade, strategy scholars have increasingly converged on organizational 
capabilities as a key construct in strategy research.   We explicate some of the underlying, 
unstated assumptions of current capabilities-based work by drawing on seminal work in the 
philosophy of social science, particularly the debate between methodological individualism 
and collectivism.  We argue that a number of explanatory anomalies as well as the apparent 
lack of progress in capabilities-based work are partly due to much of capabilities-based 
work being based on collectivist notions that sidestep critical individual-level 
considerations, including individual action and heterogeneity.  In this note we do not deny 
or reject the notion of routines or capabilities per se, but rather call for an increased 
emphasis on how these collective structures originate and change as a result of individual 
actions. 
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 Strategy scholars are increasingly converging on organizational capabilities as a key construct in 
strategy (e.g., Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000; Teece, Pisano, & Shuen, 1997; Henderson & 
Cockburn, 1994; Nelson & Winter, 1982; Winter, 2003; Zollo & Winter, 2002).  Building on 
resource-based logic (Barney 1991) and notions of routines (Nelson & Winter, 1982), the 
organizational capabilities approach has become one of the predominant ways of thinking about 
heterogeneity and performance in strategic management.  However, despite over two decades of 
largely theoretical (and some applied) work, as well as recent efforts to clarify the meanings of 
organizational routines and capabilities (e.g., Helfat & Peteraf, 2003; Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000; 
Winter, 2003; Zollo & Winter, 2002; Zott, 2003), fundamental questions about their existence, 
operationalization, and theoretical status still persist (cf. Williamson, 1999; Foss 2003). 
 The purpose of this note is to explicate some of the underlying, unstated assumptions of 
current capabilities-based work in an effort to provide a more solid philosophical foundation for 
future work.  We do so by drawing on seminal work in the philosophy of social science, more 
specifically the debate on methodological individualism versus methodological collectivism 
(e.g., Elster, 1989; Nagel, 1961; O’Neill, 1972; Popper, 1957, 1959; Rosenberg, 1995; Udehn, 
2002).  While this debate has seldom been explicitly applied or invoked in the context of 
strategic management, or the capabilities-based work more specifically, we argue that the field 
stands to gain from an analysis of its key concepts and ideas. Recent work in strategy has quite 
persuasively pointed out the value of clearly articulating the philosophical underpinnings of our 
theory (Powell, 2001, 2002; also see Poole & Van de Ven, 1989). Underlying, philosophical 
assumptions, though often unstated, not only take sides in ongoing philosophical debates, but 
also drive the questions being asked in our field (Rosenberg, 1995: 3-4).   
 To foreshadow our conclusions, we argue that a number of explanatory anomalies as well 
as the apparent lack of progress in capabilities-based work are partly due to much capabilities-
based work being based on collectivist notions that sidestep numerous individual-level 
considerations, including individual action and heterogeneity.  While it seems that the original 
intention of capabilities based work in economics was to explain firm heterogeneity based on a 
figurative metaphor between individual skills and collective routines/knowledge (Nelson & 
Winter, 1982: 72, 124; cf. Foss 2003), the latter has received a literal life of its own in 
subsequent research in strategic management (e.g., Brown & Duguid, 1991; Kogut & Zander, 
1992; Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998).  Routines and capabilities, rather than individual behavior, 
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have become explanatory primitives in this approach.  In contrast, we argue for an increased 
focus on micro-foundations and individual action as an antecedent to collective concepts.  Note 
that we do not deny or reject the notion of capabilities or collective structures per se, but rather 
call for an increased emphasis on how organizational capabilities originate and change as a 
result of individual actions.  While extant work focuses on the persistence and replication of 
routines and capabilities - the question of their origin has remained unanswered and elusive 
(Murmann, Aldrich, Levinthal, & Winter, 2003: 29).  Overall, in broad strokes, we call for a 
theoretical foundation for organizational capabilities research based on a “weak” or 
“institutional” form of individualism, which recognizes the existence and influence of collective 
structures, but mandates that they be explained in terms of past and present individual action. 
 
The Debate: A Brief Overview 
Reviewing the debate between individualism and collectivism in any exhaustive or 
comprehensive way is beyond the scope of this research note (see Udehn, 2001 for a recent 
overview), though a brief review serves our purposes.  The general relevance of the debate is 
perhaps suggested by the fact that it has been front and center intermittently in a number of the 
disciplines that strategy fields draws on, including: economics (e.g., Arrow, 1974, 1994; Boland, 
1982; Brennan & Buchanan, 1985), sociology (e.g., Coleman, 1986, 1990; Homans, 1964; 
Sawyer, 2002; Wrong, 1961), and philosophy (e.g., Elster, 1989; Hayek, 1952; Popper, 1959). 
The dividing lines have been such that they have created heated debate and controversy within 
these disciplines, and unlikely, like-minded allies between disciplines.  
 Methodological individualism in its purest form builds on the ontological argument that 
only individuals are real, that they ‘exhaust the social world’ without remainder (Kincaid, 1997), 
and that theorizing should reflect this.  This strong form of individualism denies the existence 
and causal influence of collectives and institutions and argues that they must be reduced to and 
explained in terms of individuals – that is, individual endowments, intentions, desires, 
expectations, and goals (cf. Elster, 1989; Tuomela, 1989).  In fact, some radical methodological 
individualists have advocated the complete reduction of all social phenomena to psychological 
analysis of the mental states of individuals (“psychologism” e.g., Watkins, 1952); however, most 
methodological individualists more modestly argue that a focus on individuals, their interaction, 
and the origin of structure from individual action provides the raison d’etre of social science 
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(Coleman, 1986, 1990; Elster, 1989; Homans, 1964). 
 In contrast, methodological collectivism starts with the assumption or even assertion of the 
independence of collectives from individuals (Durkheim, 1952; Udehn, 2002). That is, 
collectives such as organization and society, and “social facts” such as institutions and culture 
serve as the independent variables determining individual and collective behavior and outcomes 
(e.g., DiMaggio & Powell, 1991: 8).  The broad argument is that the individual is inherently a 
social being, or that structure and institutions are prior to individuals in influencing choice sets 
and behavior; an argument that has been endorsed by proponents of the organizational 
capabilities perspective (Dosi 1995; Spender, 1996).  Durkheim’s famous research on suicide is 
the canonical argument for the influence of these extra-individual forces. This collectivist 
tradition “… rests wholly on the basic principle that social facts must be studied as things, that is, 
as realities external to the individual” (Durkheim, 1952: 39; also see Rosenberg, 1995).  
 As we see it, a number of compelling arguments can be advanced in favor of 
methodological individualism (e.g., Hayek 1952; Coleman 1990). Reviewing these in a 
comprehensive manner is also beyond the scope of this note. We simply note that 
methodological collectivism is an unsatisfactory approach, because it 1) ascribes independent 
causal powers to collective entities, 2) suppresses more “micro” explanatory mechanisms that are 
located at the level of individual action, and 3) and therefore also neglects the complicated 
processes of interaction between individuals (Hayek 1952; Ullman-Margalitt 1977). Not 
surprisingly, there is a strong tendency in methodological collectivism to treat individuals as 
homogenous.  Below we will more carefully explicate the consequences of the pervasive 
collectivism in extant capabilities-based work.   
 
Methodological Collectivism in  
the Organizational Capabilities Approach  
 
Knowledge and capabilities based work in strategy often starts with the assumption of collective 
heterogeneity in routines and knowledge (Nelson & Winter, 1982). While Nelson and Winter 
discuss the importance of knowledge at the individual level (i.e. skills), their arguments 
nevertheless quickly move to give primary emphasis to organizational routines as guiding 
individual behavior and in effect being the ’genes’ of the organization (1982: 9, 14, 134-135).  
While the metaphor between individual skills and collective routines seems to originally have 
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been developed as a figurative metaphor, more recent work has moved toward a quite literal 
direction (Cohen et al., 1996).  Moreover, Nelson and Winter’s interest was in the analytical 
levels of the industry and the economy rather than of the firm.  Perhaps for these reasons, they 
did not clarify and solve the aggregation problem of moving from individual to organization 
level behavior, leaving the ontological status of routines and capabilities unclear.  
 The problem remains unresolved in the capabilities literature; however, organizational 
routines and capabilities have assumed a literal life of their own ⎯ explicitly independent of 
individuals.  The underlying assumption aligns itself directly with the Durkheimian collectivist 
tradition discussed above (Durkheim, 1952: 39), which presumes that a priori structure and 
higher-level collectives (or “social facts”) are the force majeure influencing or even determining 
both individual and collective outcomes. Thus, individuals are “rounded out” in the analysis, as 
social facts – such as routines or capabilities – provide the causal factors in this methodological 
collectivist strategic theory. This rounding out of individuals has recently been postulated 
explicitly, with some even making conjectures toward the complete disappearance of individuals 
from our equations (Murmann et al. 2003: 27). The assumption of the independence of 
collectives and routines from individuals is now a prevalent assumption in the capabilities and 
learning literatures (e.g., Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998: 247; also see Levitt & March, 1988: 320). 
As a practical example of this independence, Kogut and Zander insist that organizational 
knowledge and capabilities do not change as a function of individual turnover (1992: 383; also 
see Madsen, Mosakowski, & Zaheer, 2003). 
 Capabilities-based research argues that routines and capabilities are the genes of the 
organization, which, evolve over time, provide the key genetic make-up of organization (e.g., 
Nelson & Winter, 1982: 9, 134-135) and constitute the critical antecedent to performance 
heterogeneity (Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000). However, this conceptualization has disregarded 
several key individual level considerations, including the initial conditions of organizational 
founders who create these structures, individual endowments, subsequent reflexive action by 
individuals, and the induction of new members into the organization. Furthermore, for an 
approach that is often taken to be oriented towards “history,” there is a surprising lack of 
attention to such key historical considerations.  Thus, consideration for individuals and their role 
in creating and enabling collective structures has been lacking, resulting in a reversal of causality 
from organizational routine to individual skill versus the other way around.  Most alarmingly – 
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more recent arguments are ominously moving even further away from individual-level 
considerations. For example, Aldrich argues for a potential shift completely away from 
individuals, conjecturing that “if we truly focused on routines, competencies, practices and so on, 
we would not follow people anymore in our research” (Murmann, Aldrich, Levinthal, & Winter, 
2003: 25-27; emphasis in original text).   
 Recent work has also argued for the existence and importance of aggregates or 
collections of routines and nth level capabilities (Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000; Helfat & Peteraf, 
2003; Nelson, 1991; Winter, 2003; Zollo & Winter, 2002; Zott, 2003). However, this has only 
further muddied the already muddy waters by piling one enigma upon another. Clarity on the 
basic construct is first required, before more elaborate explications.  For example, Winter (2003) 
recently attempts to clarify the notion of dynamic capability by introducing a zero level 
capability in the capability hierarchy.  The zero level capability manifests itself in an 
organization at equilibrium, where “… an organization keeps earning its living by producing and 
selling the same product, on the same scale and to the same customer population over time” 
(Winter, 2003: 992).  A first-order ‘dynamic’ capability is, for example, product development, or 
geographic expansion (Winter, 2003: 992; also see Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000).  However, 
treating an organization as a monolithic whole does not advance our understanding of the origin 
of heterogeneity, or the origin of these potential capabilities. That is, while the link between 
routine/capability and performance has been explicated, it has been done without providing the 
underlying microfoundations for their development. This requires careful consideration for the 
individuals, which create and enable them.  The zero level could more fruitfully be thought of as 
the initial conditions (including founders, managers, and original rules for interaction) of the 
organization, rather than the equilibrium alluded to by Winter (2003).  The equilibrium 
advocated by us then has close ties to Simon’s equilibrium (1947), which focuses on individual 
inducements and contributions.  Overall, while the goal of Winter’s paper is to “reduce the 
mystery surrounding both the terminology and phenomenon [of organizational capabilities]” 
(Winter, 2003: 991), the effort does not resolve key questions about the origin of routines or 
capabilities – a key question given that they are postulated as the source of heterogeneity.   
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Consequences of Methodological Collectivism 
The choices that the strategic management community makes with respect to methodological 
individualism versus collectivism in theorizing have deep consequences. These choices drive the 
questions being asked in our field and they strongly influence the answers that are given.  
Therefore, they also have implications for managerial practice. Here we briefly review some of 
the unfortunate explanatory consequences of the methodological collectivist stance of the 
capabilities perspective in strategic management.   
 Routines and capabilities are ill-defined. While extra-individual knowledge structures such 
as routines and capabilities currently carry cachet and initial appeal, they begin to deflate under 
closer inspection.  Most conspicuously, no clear definition of routines and capabilities has been 
advanced to date (see the attempts in Cohen et al. 1996). When writers try to proffer definitions, 
they often pack so much into routines and capabilities that they effectively become identical to 
the organization itself, including heuristics, strategies, organizational processes and 
arrangements, cognitive issues (e.g., “organizational memories”), and incentives (“truces”) 
(Nelson & Winter, 1982).  While it may indeed be the case that in actuality  “… skills, 
organization, and ‘technology’ are intimately intertwined in a functioning routine, and it is 
difficult to say where one aspect ends and another begins” (Nelson & Winter, 1982: 104), 
nevertheless more clarity is needed.  It is one thing to claim that ontologically, things are a mess; 
it is another thing to openly admit the mess into analysis.  However, if there are no 
individualistic foundations for the analysis of routines and capabilities, we submit that the mess 
is simply unavoidable.  Problems of definition are almost bound to produce problems of 
empirical application, and the issues of testability and operationalization have indeed plagued 
this stream of research since its very origins.  
 A lop-sided view of economic organization. The collectivist focus of capabilities-based 
work is evident in the essentially ad hoc assumption that knowledge inside firms can be 
communicated at low costs, while knowledge between firms can only be communicated at high 
cost ⎯ an assumption that may make sense if it is implicitly assumed that individuals within a 
firm are basically homogenous or work voluntarily.  Of course, this ignores the fact that 
knowledge, even within organizational settings, is not voluntarily shared in a seamless 
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production environment (as argued by Kogut & Zander, 1992: 384), but rather is exchanged (cf. 
Teece, 2003).  That is, it cannot be assumed that individuals only have the collective good in 
mind, as individuals after all are the key value creators and appropriators (Coff, 1999; also see 
Osterloh, Frost, & Rota, 2001).  Furthermore, for capabilities-based work it has been easy to 
postulate that “firms know more than their contracts can tell” and that all organizational aspects 
are “intertwined in a functioning routine.” If instead the analysis had started in an explicit 
methodological individualist mode, that is, from individual choice behavior, the argument that 
communication costs within, for example, certain business units may be lower than the 
communication costs between people in the unit and people in a supplier firm, might have been 
derived as an outcome of a properly specified model instead of being postulated. The problem is 
that there is no theory of individual choice behavior in the organizational capabilities approach, 
so that writers in the organizational capabilities approach have to treat economic organization in 
a methodological collectivist way, namely in terms of postulating somewhat crude causal 
relations between capabilities and economic organization, little attention being paid to the 
microanalytic issues involved. 
 Routines and capabilities may be bad for practice. What are the practical implications and 
microfoundations for such collective theorizing without consideration for individuals? The 
collectivist orientation underlying the capabilities approach provides a radical departure from the 
raison d’etre of strategic management, which ought to provide actionable and useful theoretical 
insights for the practicing manager (Rumelt, Shendel, & Teece, 1994; cf. Whetten, 2002).   If 
individuals can be disregarded, it is hard to make sense of organizational strategy, including 
installing incentive schemes, delegating decisions to empower employees, etc.  The more 
fundamental questions of strategy are individual level indeed – including questions about the 
origin of structure, decision-making power, motivation, appropriation etc. – all outside the 
purview of current capabilities-based work.  Nelson and Winter insightfully recognize that in 
theorizing - “theorists should aim to tell the truth in their theorizing, but they cannot aim to tell 
the whole truth.  For to theorize is precisely to focus on those entities and relationships in reality 
that are believed to be central to the phenomenon observed – and largely ignore the rest” (Nelson 
& Winter, 1982: 134).  Overall, we believe that capabilities-based work has focused on the 
wrong ‘central’ elements of extra-individual routines, while starting with individuals and 
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individual action and interaction provide a better starting point, particularly given that our field 
needs to offer useful theoretical insights, even for the practising manager. 
 
Future Directions and Unanswered Questions 
A methodological individualist perspective suggests that collective structures and interaction are 
artefacts (or a “phenotype,” to retain the evolutionary language) of individual action, and thus are 
only of secondary interest in theorizing about the firm, with the individual (of necessity) 
receiving primacy.2  While studying these artefacts can perhaps be of some material value to 
strategic management, they should be dependent, rather than independent variables.  Studying 
the individuals creating and enabling these artefacts provides a more fruitful focus of 
investigation. That is, the central feature or focus of organizational and strategic analysis is the 
individual (cf. McKelvey, 1982; also see Barnard, 1938; Simon, 1985), rather than the routine.  
 Overall we have discussed the current collectivist focus of extant capabilities-based work.  
While we do not have an alternative theory, nevertheless we briefly point to unanswered 
questions and potential conceptual directions for future research. Our original methodological 
individualism versus collectivism dichotomy provides the overall intuition for what is needed in 
the future.  While we do not advocate a completely atomistic, individualistic approach, we  do 
believe that a weak or institutional form of individualism provides an adequate amount of 
consideration for individuals, though it also recognizes the causal influence of routines and/or 
other collective structures.  In broad strokes we discuss three areas that deserve further 
consideration, in an effort to move capabilities-based work ahead toward a more careful 
explication of underlying microfoundations. 
First, the bridge law or linkage between individual and collective knowledge (or to put it 
in Nelson & Winter’s terms – between “skills” and “routines”) needs to be explicated, as the link 
between individual skills and collective routines has remained at the level of a metaphor (1982: 
72).  The skills-routines metaphor, while intuitively appealing, has received a life of its own and 
subsequently has provided little of theoretical or practical value for scholars to build on, let alone 
a useful heuristic for the practicing manager (cf. Whetten, 2002). The linkage question is, how 
                                                     
2 The insight of collective interaction and structures as artefact is attributable to the pioneering work of the 
economist and Nobel Laureate James Buchanan, who persuasively argues that the state is simply an artefact of 
individual decision making, and thus should not be the primary focus of analysis (Buchanan & Tullock, 1962: 13).   
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exactly do we aggregate from individual skills to collective routines? Aggregation problems have 
been notably problematic in the social sciences (e.g., Arrow, 1951), but nevertheless attempts at 
their resolution are absolutely critical in moving theoretical arguments forward. The aggregation 
or linkage question has largely been side-stepped by arguing for the emergence, or even 
complete independence, of collective knowledge from individuals – summarized in the popular 
dictum: “the whole is more than the sum of its parts”.  From a philosophical perspective 
however, citing emergence at the collective level has simply been characterized as an admission 
of ones ignorance about the parts, which make up the whole (Nagel, 1961: 380-396).  The gold 
standard for dealing with potentially emergent properties is a proper accounting of the parts 
(individuals in this case), which make up the whole (Morgan, 1923), though in capabilities-based 
work they are simply assumed to be homogeneous, “voluntary actors” (Kogut & Zander, 1992).   
Second, related to the above, what deserves more careful explication is both the causal 
relationship and levels assumptions between individual and collective.  For example, 
organizational research, particularly strategy, tends to equate managerial action with 
organizational action (cf. Klein, Tosi, & Cannella, 1999: 247).  This is readily evident in the 
capabilities literature as well (e.g., Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000; Helfat & Peteraf, 2003).  
Furthermore, levels assumptions and issues have scarcely been thought about in the strategy 
content literature, despite recent advancements in levels work with applications to leadership 
studies and organizational behavior (Dansereau et al., 1999; Klein et al., 1994; Rousseau, 1985). 
For example, given the organizational level focus, strategy research has implicitly made the 
assumption of individual homogeneity.  The organization, its routines and capabilities, somehow 
are heterogeneous with homogeneous actors at the lower level. This characterization seems 
somewhat of a stretch, and simply breaks with the philosophical assumption of supervenience, 
which states that change at a higher level only happens as a function of change at a lower level 
(e.g., Sawyer, 2001) – an assumption which seems almost self-evident when applied to 
organizational analysis.    
The third and final fairly evident, though largely overlooked, consideration is the 
observation that much of what happens within organizations can scarcely be labeled as routine 
(Williamson, 2002: 426; also see Barnard, 1968: 240; Garicano, 2000: 898).  That is, individuals 
within organizations, particularly managers, deal with exceptions rather than the routine.  
Therefore, within a given organizational setting, perhaps depending on various task or industry-
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specific contingencies, certain individuals provide the parameters or constraints within which 
action is taken (cf. Brennan & Buchanan, 1985; Elster, 2000).  This gives way to a two-stage 
process where (for example) standard operating procedures and rules of interaction are first 
created and specified by organizational founders or managers, and then individuals interact given 
these collective structures or constraints (Foss & Foss 2000).  While this perhaps is not 
completely inconsistent with current conceptualizations of routines and capabilities, extant work 
does not explicate the origin of these collective structures, or the first step alluded to above.  Of 
course we do recognize that methodological individualist perspective does not rule out the 
possibility that routines and other collective entities at the organizational level may emerge in a 
partly unplanned manner (Ullmann-Margalit, 1977).  However, purposeful, individual action 
should provide the starting point for the development of collective structures.  Furthermore, 
given the inevitable ‘degeneracy’ in closed systems of interaction, the key role that external 
individuals provide in breaking up myopic structures should be recognized.  That is, “degeneracy 
is avoided if there is turnover” (March, 1991: 80), and insight which capabilities-based work 
implicitly denies given its collectivist focus (Kogut & Zander, 1992: 382).    
 
Conclusion 
Our hope is that this note will serve as a clarion call of sorts for capabilities-based scholars to 
pay more careful attention to their underlying assumptions, and to develop theoretical arguments, 
which give primacy to individuals.  We concur with Barnard that “… the individual is always the 
basic strategic factor of organization” (1968: 139).  Thus, with individuals at the locus of 
knowledge, the questions for capabilities-based work should shift to explicating how routines are 
created and emerge from individual action, and how they dialectically evolve with the 
subsequent interaction between individual and collective.  Our arguments should not be 
misinterpreted as a call for completely rational or conscious design of routines and capabilities, 
but rather we recognize that: “History is the result of human action, not of human design” 
(Elster, 1989: 91).  However, we do challenge the completely behavioral, organic, and 
structurally-oriented approaches, which have not clearly delineated the origin of this structure.  
Overall, we think that primacy should be given to managers as the linchpin between opportunity 
and constraint, that is, in their role as specifying the interaction of individuals.   
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While we have no ontological problems with the existence and potential influence of 
collective structures on individual behavior as such (contrary to ‘strong’ forms of methodological 
individualism – e.g., Watkins, 1952), nevertheless we argue that strategy has partially lost its 
problem or original question by beginning analysis with structures and routines, while their 
origin should be of interest and the primary focus (cf. Williamson, 1999; also see Coleman, 
1990: 31; Wrong, 1961: 183).  That is, structure and routines are an artifact of past individual 
decision making and heterogeneity, and do not emerge exogenously or ex nihilo.  While there 
most certainly are (for example) exogenous institutions, which partially determine firm level 
outcomes (cf. Oliver, 1997), they nevertheless influence firms more or less equally and thus are 
not a source of heterogeneity, while an internal focus proves more fruitful (Barney & Hesterly, 
1996).  Overall, we believe that a weak form of methodological individualism can help us 
uncover and account for the origin of routines and rules of interaction.   
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